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ABSTRACT
A firm's need to achieve financial and managerial goals represents
the most fundamental reason for the existence of interfirm relationships
within channels of distribution. Yet, no study in the marketing channels
literature has linked financial performance and goal attainment to the
nature of the interfirm business relationship. This paper develops a
model of relative goal attainment within a two firm channel relation-
ship (based on norms within the distribution channel) and links the
model to the nature of the firms' interactions, sentiments, and compat-
ibility based on an empirical study in a franchise channel system.

INTERFIRM CHANNEL RELATIONSHIPS
Our understanding of business firm relationships within channels
of distribution has been substantially increased in recent years based
on descriptive and empirical research in the marketing channels litera-
ture. Three topic areas have received considerable emphasis in this
research stream, each of significant importance to distribution channel
management and to the development of more efficient channel systems:
(1) the structure of the two firm channel relationship; (2) business
firm interactions; and (3) business firm sentiments. The structure of
the two firm channel relationship has been studied primarily in terms
of interfirm power considerations (Reve and Stem 1979). Research in
Stem (1969) introduced the concept of power into marketing channels
literature and highlighted its apparent importance. Within empirical
research, whether or not channels have well defined power structures
(El-Ansary and Stem 1972; Wilkinson 1974), the identification and
measurement of various sources of a firm's power within a channel re-
lationship such as coercive versus noncoercive or economic versus non-
economic sources and their implications (Hunt and Nevin 1974; Lusch
1976, 1977; Etgar 1978), and relative levels of power (Etgar 1976) have
been addressed.
Business firm interactions within the channel relationship have
been described and empirically examined. Here, the emphasis has been
on the means by which firms communicate in attempts to (1) gain in-
fluence on each other's behavior and (2) facilitate coordination of
channel activities (cf
.
, Beier and Stem 1969; Stem and Heskett
1969; Stem and El-Ansary 19 77; Angelmar and Stern 1978; Kasulis and
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Spekman 1980). Empirical results in Hunt and Nevin (1974), Lusch
(1979, 1977), and Brown and Frazier (1978) suggest that while a rela-
tively coercive influence approach may be effective in achieving a
channel member's compliance in the short run, its use will, in all
probability, serve to alienate the channel member and prove relatively
costly to the long run relationship.
The nature of business firm sentiments such as satisfaction, co-
operation, and conflict and business firm compatibility resulting from
ongoing, two firm channel relationships have been of marked interest.
Mallen (1963) and Alderson (1965) described the importance of coopera-
tion and compatability in the distribution channel relationship while
Assael (1968), Stem and Heskett (1969), Stem and Gorman (1969),
Rosenberg and Stem (1970), and Rosenbloom (1973) centered on implica-
tions surrounding conflict and its resolution and their impact on a
channel relationship. Rosenberg and Stem (1971) were the first to
measure levels of conflict in a distribution channel. In subsequent
empirical research, conflict and/or satisfaction levels have been
related to a firm's coercive and noncoercive bases of power within
the relationship (Hunt and Nevin 1974; Lusch 1976, 1977) and a channel
member's perceived self-control over decision areas and the coopera-
tiveness of partners in the channel (Dwyer 1980). Stem, Stemthal,
and Craig (1973) investigated the relative efficiency of alternative
methods of conflict management by a superordinate goal and exchange
of persons mechanism.
Despite the progress made in understanding distribution channel
relationships based on this research stream, a gap presently exists in
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this literature. Financial and/or managerial goal attainment is the
driving force behind the initiation and existence of distribution chan-
nel relationships as it represents the overriding objective that members
of business firms seek from participating in channel relationships (cf., .
Beier and Stem 1969; Stem and Brown 1969; Reve and Stem 1979). Addi-
tionally, evaluations of current performance relative to financial and/or
managerial goals provides the manager important information and bench-
marks upon which future plans and business strategies are formulated
and implemented within a firm's internal and external environment
(Duncan and Hollander 1977; Kotler 1980). The comparison by one channel
member of his or her firm's goal attainment relative to the goal attain-
ment of a channel partner would appear to have important implications
in their channel relationship, perhaps shaping, in part, the channel
member's reactions to the requests and coordination attempts of the
other firm as well as influencing his or her own influence objectives,
aspirations, and general behavior in the ongoing relationship. As
indicated by Singh, Reve, and Stem (1981), whether or not the overall
goals or objectives of each party in the two firm channel relationship
are being met could significantly alter the nature of interfirm inter-
actions and the resulting conflicts which exist in the relationship.
Thus it appears that the equivalency or discrepancy of each firm's level
of goal attainment within the two firm relationship represents another
structural variable aside from interfirm power which may significantly
influence the nature of the firms' interactions , sentiments , and
compatibility within the ongoing channel relationship. Yet, despite
its apparent importance in helping to explain variations in interactions.
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sentiments, and compatibility, no study has linked relative levels of
business firm goal attainment to these dimensions or to the general
nature of interfirm relationships within a marketing channel.
PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF THIS STUDY
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the importance and implica-
tions of relative levels of goal attainment in the two firm business
relationship. A model of relative goal attainment in the two firm
channel relationship is first developed based on whether or not each
firm achieves a satisfactory level of goal attainment from the rela-
tionship and the equivalency or differential of their goal attainment
levels. The business interaction, sentiment, and compatibility dimen-
sions are discussed as they relate to this study, including research
hypotheses linking them to the goal attainment model. Empirical re-
sults from a study in the automobile distribution channel, a franchise
channel system, are used to evaluate the hypotheses.
The scope of this paper is limited in several ways. The relative
goal attainment model may have little importance in some distribution
channels or some channel relationships. For relative goal attainment
to be of significance, channel members must have knowledge or at least
perceptions about their goal attainment and their channel partner's
goal attainment. Where firms have so many channel relationships as to
make evaluations of every firms' contributions to the others' goal
attainment very difficult, the relative goal attainment concept may
not be of significant importance. On the other hand, in franchise
channel systems where a typical franchisee has only one or very few
suppliers or in traditional or administered channel systems where the
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bulk of a manufacturer's, wholesaler's, or retailer's business lies
with very few channel relationships, such knowledge may be more readily
available and such perceptions may be more easily developed. As such,
data were collected from a franchise channel system in this study.
The basis for satisfactory or unsatisfactory goal attainment in
the model and the study is from a channel system's viewpoint; that is,
based on how well a firm is doing in meeting financial and/or managerial
goals and objectives relative to other members in the channel (at the
same level). Members of a firm may, in part, judge and evaluate its
performance relative to the performance that other similar firms within
the channel are achieving (cf. , Hill 1963; Bearchell 1975; Duncan and
Hollander 1977; Stem and El-Ansary 1977). As such, channel norms
concerning satisfactory and unsatisfactory performance are stressed.
Another basis for satisfactory goal attainment is from a more
"personal" or "individualized" viewpoint. No matter the industry or
channel norms, managers could judge their business on a different basis
or have other goals and objectives which they, personally, are seeking.
For example, a firm might attain a return on investment figure which is
not satisfactory from an industry standpoint. However, if improvements
are being made each year (e.g., increases from to 3 precent, from 3
to 7 percent) the goals of the managers could be satisfied in the short
run. While this more personalized element of goal attainment is certainly
important, it is not dealt with in this paper.
In discussing the nature of business interactions, only a manufac-
turer's use of communication strategies in attempts to attain influence
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on a dealer's or retailer's behavior is discussed. Additionally, busi-
ness sentiments and compatibility are discussed and based on the view-
point of only one member of the two firm relationship, the dealer or
retailer. It is recognized that (1) the personnel of each firm in a
two party relationship can utilize influence strategies and attempt to
influence the other's decision making, (2) many important two-firm
channel relationships do not involve a manufacturer and dealer or
retailer, and (3) a true two-party focus would be more desirable.
These limitations must be addressed in future research, using this
study as a base.
. A MODEL OF RELATIVE GOAL ATTAINMENT
IN THE TWO FIRM CHANNEL RELATIONSHIP
Singh, Reve, and Stem (1981), in discussing the concept of "envi-
ronmental capacity" developed by Aldrich (1979) differentiate between
rich and lean channel environments. They indicate that firms in a low
consumer demand, poor financial situation, lacking a large resource base
face a lean environmental capacity, while in a high demand, good finan-
cial situation a rich environmental capacity situation exists for the
firms. Singh, et al . (1981) go on to state (p. 17), "It is possible
that the overall character of environmental capacity—rich vs. lean
—
could be a main determinant of channel sentiments and behavior, irre-
spective of the levels of other dimensions." This statement highli^ts
the importance that the financial situation and goal attainment may
have on the nature of channel relationships.
A model of relative goal attainment in the two firm channel rela-
tionship is developed in Figure 1 which extends the "rich", "lean" logic
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developed by Singh, et al. (1981). The basis of the model is whether or
not each firm in the two firm channel relationship is receiving satis-
factory goal attainment . If both firm's objectives are being met in
a satisfactory manner (cell one), an ideal situation exists where both
firms are receiving reasonable and relatively equitable benefits from
2
doing business with one another. Such channel relationships are cer-
tainly the most stable and relatively long-lasting and can be found in
most, if not all, marketing channels. Only the distribution of two
firm relationships meeting this ideal condition would appear to vary
across alternative channels and channel systems. For example, the
Coca-Cola channel system has had considerable success in the past
where both Coca-Cola and many of its bottlers receive satisfactory
levels of goal attainment from their ongoing business relationship.
[Place Figure 1 About Here]
Within both cells two and four in Figure 1, a disequilibrium exists
where one firm gains more benefits from the channel relationship than
the other; one firm achieves satisfactory goal attainment while the
other does not. For example, some automobile dealers traditionally
representing only one domestic car manufacturer are currently attaining
satisfactory goal attainment by emphasizing used car sales and acquiring
rights to sell certain lines of foreign cars. The goal attainment of
the domestic automobile manufacturer in these same relationships is
generally unsatisfactory because their new car sales are lower than
desired. On the other hand, the domestic oil companies are currently
achieving satisfactory goal attainment from transactions with many of
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their service stations while managers of many of these same service
stations are facing rising costs and a gross margin squeeze and are
not reaching their business goals as a result.
Finally, in cell three in the model (Figure 1), neither firm with-
in the two firm relationship is attaining reasonable benefits nor
reaching desired goals from doing business with one another; both firms
are losing. Some turnover of members in two-firm relationships will
exist in all distribution channels over time because goals are not being
achieved due to such factors as mismanagement and/or economic conditions.
For a more specific example, A & P recently closed a number of stores
because financial goals were not being attained at either the corporate
or retail channel level.
As suggested previously, it is expected that business interactions,
sentiments, and compatibility within the two firm channel relationship
will vary based on the relationship's goal attainment category, its
placement within the cells in Figure 1. The specific nature of these
expectations is next developed.
BUSINESS FIRM INTERACTIONS, SENTIMENTS,
COMPATIBILITY AND RESEARCH HYPOTHESES
Business Firm Interaction
Firms and their personnel often have motives for attempting to
achieve influence on other firms' perceptions and/or decision making.
Improving channel coordination and partner performance as well as win-
ning in conflicting goal situations are examples of important motives
for influence which exist in most distribution channels (cf . , Beier
and Stem 1969; Lusch 1978; Wilkinson 1978; Cadotte and Stem 1979).
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In order to implement such motives, a firm's boundary personnel must
select from among a variety of influence or communication stratgies
and then utilize them in attempts to attain influence over the other
party (Beier and Stem 1969; Stem and Heskett 1969; Tedeschi, et al.
1973). As Tedeschi, et al . (1973, p. 32) state, "For influence to be
exercised some form of communication must occur in which the source
makes known to the target his preferences, demands, or wishes."
Communication Strategies . Six influence strategies are of interest
in this study, ranging from relatively indirect and nonpressurized to
relatively direct and pressurized. The information exchange strategy
involves the use of discussions by the boundary person on general busi-
ness issues where information and/or opinions are offered to the other
firm (Raven and Kruglanski 1970). General operating philosophies are
stressed when using this strategy and while the boundary person may dis-
cuss general strategy on certain issues, no specific dealer action is
requested. Information exchange represents the most indirect and non-
pressurized influence strategy analyzed in this study.
When the boundary person predicts favorable consequences to result
from the dealer's performance of a specific action or actions based on
the nature of the general business and market environment, a recommendation
strategy is being utilized (Angelmar and Stem 1978). Like the information
exchange strategy, the boundary person in using this strategy attempts
to alter dealer perceptions regarding the inherent desirability of the
intended behavior. However, this strategy is more direct and pressurized
in comparison with the information exchange strategy in that it urges the
dealer to take a specific action. It is apparent to the dealer that the
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boundary person is attempting to alter some specific element of the
dealership's autonomous decision making and may, as a result, be suspi-
cious of the boundary person's motives, especially if recommendations
are used inappropriately over time.
Rather than attempt to influence dealer perceptions of appropriate
decision strategy, a boundary person can decide to center directly on
behavioral change. In using a request strategy, the boundary person merely
informs the dealer of the action(s) he would like the target to take; no
consequences of compliance or noncon5)liance are mentioned or implied. Its
use may be particularly effective where an atmosphere of "give and take"
exists in the relationship. Even though requests center directly on
behavior, they are seen to be more indirect and less pressurized than
recommendations because no consequences of the target's subsequent
behavior are implied; less direction and interference are present when
using requests.
Promises are used when the boundary person promises future mediated
inducements (e.g., more cooperation on product allocation) for dealer
compliance on a business issue (Parsons 1963; Tedeschi, et^ al. 1973;
Angelmar and Stem 1978). When the boundary person threatens the tar-
get with punishments for noncompliant behavior, a threat strategy is
being utilized (Parsons 1963; Tedeschi, et al . 1973; Angelmar and
Stem 1978). Finally , in using a legalistic reference , the boundary
person refers to some legal standard existing in the relationship and
implies he will take punitive actions should the target fail to comply
with his desires (Parsons 1963; Kasulis and Spekman 1980). The final
three strategies are all relatively direct and pressurized where (1)
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a specific action is requested, (2) consequences of dealer compliance
or noncompliance are stressed, and (3) the boundary person and/or the
manufacturer directly mediate the relationship based on the nature of
the dealer's response to the influence attempt. While some social
psychologists have viewed the use of promises or a reward strategy
primarily in a favorable light (cf., French and Raven 1959; Tedeschi,
£t al . 1973), Beier and Stern (1969) contend that use of a reward
strategy possesses coercive elements, however subtle, and Hill, et al.
(1975) indicate that special rewards must be offered with caution in
3business relationships.
Use of the Strategies and Relative Goal Attainment . When both the
manufacturer and dealer are achieving satisfactory goal attainment,
a relatively congenial and open atmosphere may exist in the relation-
ship (Stern 1977; Dwyer 1980; Dwyer and Walker 1981). In such cases,
it is expected that the information exchange strategy will be frequently
utilized by the manufacturer's personnel. Exchanges of objective infor-
mation and/or opinions by the manufacturer and the boundary person with
the dealer on general operating philosophies may represent relatively
effective means of gaining influence in these relationships based on
the congenial atmosphere and the credibility built for the manufacturer
based on the relationship's financial success (Hovland, e^ al^. 1953;
Bonoma 1976). Bock (1951) indicates that discussions are more effective
in highly cohesive relationships. Influence attempts may be primarily
motivated based on channel coordination considerations or to further
improve the other member's managerial performance and may be successful
based on each firm's current success. Frequent use of relatively direct.
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pressurized strategies (e.g., recommendations, legalistic pleas, prom-
ises, threats) with all of their associated costs (Raven and Kruglanski
1970; Hunt and Nevin 1974; Lusch 1976, 1977) may be unnecessary as a
result. Requests may not be utilized a great deal because the seeking
of favors may be unnecessary in most cases under ideal goal attain-
ment conditions; their use could inhibit the credibility of the manu-
factuer in such relationships.
When both firms' goals are not being met in a satisfactory manner,
the situation may be reversed. The dealer may, in part, blame the
manufacturer for its poor financial performance and visa versa . The
credibility of the manufacturer's personnel may be affected adversely
by the poor economic climate. Together with the existence of a rela-
tively noncongenial atmosphere, this may make use of information ex-
change strategies relatively ineffective in such cases. Requests may
be ignored; while favors may be sought by the manufacturer, the finan-
cial picture that the dealer faces may necessitate their refusal.
Relatively direct, pressurized strategies may be required in attempts
to motivate levels of influence on the other party, required when the
manufacturer decides compliance must be attained on certain interfirm
issues; strong measures to be used in a difficult situation. Promises
may be used in hopes of getting compliance on important issues for a
relatively small cost. Threats and legalistic pleas may be frequently
utilized as the dealer resists influence attempts because of his or her
precarious financial situation. Recommendations may be frequently
utilized by the boundary person, even when inappropriate.
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When one member is receiving a satisfactory level of goal attain-
ment and the other member is not, a scenario between the two extremes
may generally exist. Mid-range use of both the information exchange
strategy and the direct strategies by manufacturer personnel may be
present in such situations. Use of information exchange strategies by
boundary personnel when the manufacturer is achieving satisfactory goal
attainment may be effective to a degree because of credibility which
is bred by success. However, conflicting goals may surface and the
dealer may resist influence attempts from the manufacturer in many
instances and may make counterinfluence attempts on his or her own.
This may necessitate the use of relatively direct, pressurized com-
munication strategies by manufacturer personnel at times. When the
dealer is achieving satisfactory goal attainment but the manufacturer
is not, the dealer may be open to exchanges of information to a degree
in an effort to enhance the relationship's congeniality and balance
the benefits achieved in the relationship. However, manufacturer
personnel may attempt the use of relatively direct strategies at times
to get quick results in attempts to improve their firm's financial
standing as well as their own performance ratings (cf., Ridgeway 1957).
Requests may be frequently used in situations where one firm is
achieving satisfactory goal attainment and the other is not. A give
and take, favor giving and granting environment may tend to arise in
such relationships (cf., Blau 1964). The firm with the satisfactory
goal attainment may try to appease the other member at times through
complying, in part, with its requests. Figure 2 exhibits the posited
relationship between the strategies and the goal attainment categories.
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The predicted level of utilization of each strategy or strategy type in
Figure 2 is based on the pre-study interviews. The following hypothesis
is suggested concerning variable relationships:
Hypothesis One ; The information exchange strategy
will be frequently utilized in relationships where
both members are receiving satisfactory goal attain-
ment whereas recommendation, promises, threats, and
legalistic pleas will be frequently utilized where
both members' goals are not being met. Medium utili-
zation of these strategies and relatively frequent
use of requests will exist in cases where one member's
goal attainment is being facilitated in the relationship.
[Place Figure 2 About Here]
Business Sentiments and Goal Attainment
Three variables are of interest in reflecting business sentiments
which exist in the channel relationship in this study. Tiro involve trust,
one the dealer's general trust in the manufacturer and its personnel,
the other the dealer's specific level of trust in the primary manufacturer
boundary person in the relationship. The final variable concerns the
level of dealer cooperation with the manufacturer in their relation-
ship. As indicated by Alderson (1965) and Stem (1977), for the manu-
facturer to successfully coordinate the channel relationship and improve
dealer managerial performance, reasonably high levels of dealer trust
and cooperation must exist in their ongoing channel relationship (also
see Tedeschi, et al . 1973).
In situations where neither firm is receiving satisfactory goal
attainment from the relationship, it is expected that levels of dealer
trust and cooperation will be relatively low. As indicated previously,
the basis for most channel relationships are goals that are achieved
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through their existence (Beier and Stern 1969). When neither firm
achieves these goals in a satisfactory manner, high levels of frustra-
tion and hostility may result. Expectations concerning appropriate
rewards for entering and working in the relationship are not being met.
As a result, satisfaction levels may be low with a large number of dis-
agreements arising in the relationship concerning (1) appropriate roles
and (2) the other member's performance on its assigned role and respon-
sibilities (Alderson 1965; Gill and Stern 1969; Hunt and Nevin 1974;
Lusch 1976, 1977). The ability to resolve such conflicts may be ham-
pered by high levels of uncertainty concerning future goal attainment
and the outcomes of such resolution processes (cf., Singh, e_t al . 1981).
All of these factors, along with low credibility levels, may negatively
affect the dealer's general trustworthiness in the manufacturer and its
personnel. Additionally, the trustworthiness of the main manufacturer
boundary person may be hampered because a desperate situation often
leads to desperate actions where predictions by the boundary person at
one point in time may not be bourne out by profits or increased levels
of goal attainment in the future (Bonoma 1976). Finally, while a general
recognition of the importance of team work and vertical coordination in
the movement of goods and information may exist in such relationships
(Alderson 1965), the poor financial situation each firm faces may
motivate them to seek goals of a more individualistic nature (a very
"short run" approach) (cf.. Bock 1951; Bonoma 1976).
The opposite pattern may exist in dyads where each firm is
achieving satisfactory goal attainment. Satisfaction in a business
relationship is based on mediation of goals and meeting expectations
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concerning reasonable levels of goal attainment (Hunt and Nevin 1974;
Lusch 1977). As such, in an ideal goal attainment situation, high
levels of satisfaction in the business relationship should exist. In
this financial situation, there may be less frequent disagreements.
When conflicts do arise, they may be resolved reasonably quickly because
each firm can afford to compromise to a degree when each are receiving
satisfactory goal attainment (Bonoma 1976). Additionally, because of
the dyad's financial status, each firm may see the other as being
interested in its goal attainment. As a result of such consideration,
high levels of trustworthiness and cooperation may be the rule. Joint
undertakings and consultation on many business issues may be seen by
the channel member to have high payoff functions in these relationships.
In situations where one firm is achieving satisfactory goal attain-
ment and the other is not, a pattern of cooperation and trustworthiness
between the previously discussed extremes is expected to result. Based
on equity theory and the motivation for reciprocity (a drive for rela-
tively equal rewards based on the contributions of each party to the
relationship), the firm with the higher goal attainment may attempt to
equalize the benefits the other firm is receiving from the relationship
to a degree and, as such, may "bend a little" in interfirm discussions
so as to aid the other firm in reaching its financial objectives
(Gouldner 1960; Blau 1964). How ever, there are limits to such motiva-
tions. Levels of dissatisfaction with the current relationship (the
firm with unsatisfactory goal attainment) and jealously concerning the
other party's attainment of its goals may counterbalance this tendency.
Blau (1964, p. 26) in discussing social relationships states, "There is
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a strain toward imbalance as well as toward reciprocity in social asso-
ciations." This logic also appears to have applicability in dyadic
business relationships, especially where one firm is achieving satis-
factory goal attainment and the other is not. The following hypothesis
is suggested from this discussion:
Hypothesis Two ; Relatively high levels of dealer
cooperation and trust will exist in relationships where
each firm is receiving satisfactory goal attainment,
medium levels of these variables will exist where
only one firm is achieving satisfactory goal attain-
ment, while low levels of dealer cooperation and
trust will exist in channel relationships where neither
firm is receiving satisfactory goal attainment.
Business Compatibility and Goal Attainment
Business compatibility in this study is reflected by levels of
manufacturer and dealer agreement on general business issues and
marketing strategy. Levels of agreement are expected to be low in dyads
where neither firm is achieving satisfactory goal attainment. Credibility
levels for the manufacturer and its personnel may be low in such cases
because the dealer may question the manufacturer's (1) contribution and
performance on responsibilities within the relationship and (2) desire
to promote joint versus individualistic goals given the present financial
picture. As such, the viewpoints of the manufacturer may not be con-
sidered or, if considered, questioned to a high degree. Additionally,
Singh, et al_. (1981) suggest that when a firm faces high uncertainty in
its output environment, decision making and coordination within the
channel are also made uncertain. They indicate that environmental
capacity is a major determinant of the uncertainty levels that exist
in a two firm relationship; that is, the leaner the environment (or the
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lower the goal attainment), the greater the uncertainty. High levels
of uncertainty about future plans, actions, and resulting outcomes may
contribute to low levels of dealer agreement with manufacturer posi-
tions on decision strategy. Lastly, the less attraction that each
member has and the smaller the contribution that each member makes to
a relationship, the less cohesion that may exist therein (Blau 1964).
As indicated by Bock (1951) and Blau (1964), the smaller the level of
cohesion (integrative bonds) in a relationship, the less chance that
(1) concensus will be reached on important issues and norms and (2)
coordination of activities and perceptions will result. Additionally,
Bock (1951) indicates that the lower the cohesion, the less effort that
each party will make to reach agreement on important issues.
Because of (1) adequate to high levels of performance on channel
responsibilities by the manufacturer (and, therefore, high credibility),
(2) more emphasis on "joint" goals, (3) higher cohesion, and (4) lower
levels of uncertainty, levels of agreement should be relatively high
in two-firm relationships where each member is achieving satisfactory
goal attainment. As Bannister (1969) indicates, compatibility in a
relationship is based on the degree in which resources are present for
mutual satisfaction in both breadth and depth. When one firm is achieving
satisfactory goal attain ment, medium levels of agreement are expected to
4
exist. The following hypothesis is suggested:
Hypothesis Three ; Levels of dealer agreement with
manufacturer positions on interfirm business
issues and strategy will be (1) high when each
firm is achieving satisfactory goal attainment,
(2) medium when one firm is achieving satisfactory
goal attainment, and (3) low where neither firm is
receiving satisfactory goal attainment in the two
firm channel relationship.
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METHOD
Research Setting and Sample
A franchise system, the automobile distribution channel, was
selected as the setting for a study designed to test the research
hypotheses. A mail survey of new car dealers utilizing an eight page,
self-administered questionnaire was used to gather the data. Unstructured
personal interviews with approximately forty new car dealers and a
literature review of previous research in this channel and the general
channels literature provided the basis for the questionnaire.
The sample frame of domestic new car dealers in Indiana, Illinois,
and Ohio was obtained from the Indiana Automobile Dealer's Association
and a private consulting firm. Questionnaires were sent to 944 dealers
in a three stage mailing process designed to enhance the response rate
attained for the study. Initially, a letter introducing the project
was sent to each dealer in mid-February, 1979. A few days later the
first wave of questionnaires were sent along with a cover letter. A
follow-up questionnaire was sent two weeks later to those who had not
responded to the original questionnaire. Each questionnaire was di-
rected to the one member in each dealership having the most important
personal contact with the manufacturer and its representatives. In
the majority of dealerships, the personal name of this individual was
available and utilized in the mailing process.
The questionnaire centered on the interaction between the manu-
facturer, its boundary personnel, and its new car dealers. Each
respondent was asked what the dealership's primary make of new auto-
mobile was in 1978 (i.e., the make which the dealership sold the most
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units of in 1978). They were then instructed to answer the question-
naire based on interactions with their primary make of vehicle.
The final response rate was 46.1 percent (i.e., 435 returned ques-
tionnaires out of 944 dealers in the intended sample) which compares
very favorably with those reported in previous empirical studies on
interfirm relationships in distribution channels (e.g., Michie 1978,
16 percent; Etgar 1976, 19 percent; Brown 1978, 21 percent; Hunt and
Neven 1974, 26 percent; Rosenberg and Stern 1971, 35 percent; Lusch
1976, 47 percent). Only 12 of the returned questionnaires were unusable
due to an obvious lack of involvement on the part of the respondent
(i.e., incomplete information). The second wave produced 92 usable
questionnaires.
To evaluate whether non-response bias was a problem in the study,
three methods were utilized. First, the sample data were compared with
known values for the population of dealers on manufacturer make and unit
sales volume. The dealers in the achieved sample parallel the nationwide
distribution of dealers on these variables very closely. Second, several
dealers and manufacturer personnel in the automobile industry were con-
tacted individually about the representativeness of the data. Based on
their subjective estimates, they all concurred that the data utilized
in this study appeared to be representative and not biased. Finally,
Armstrong and Overton (1977) indicate that if first and second wave
respondents are similar, the chances of non-response bias clouding a
study's results are relatively small. This is based on the rationale
that subjects who respond less readily are similar to nonrespondents
(c.f., Pace 1939). As such, dealers from the two waves were compared
on certain dealer demographies (e.g., single or multiple point) and
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general attitudes and perceptions as well as the variables analyzed
in this study. Based on computing Hotelling's 1r statistic for each
variable set, no significant differences exist (i.e., p < .1) between
the first and second wave respondents. Considering these findings,
non-response bias does not appear to be a serious problem in this study.
Operational Measures
Relative Goal Attainment . Table 1 exhibits the manufacturer and
dealer goal variables utilized in this study and the norms of satisfactory
performance which exist in the automobile channel on these variables. The
pre-study interviews in this channel and a review of Automotive News were
used in ensuring that relative goal attainment was important concept
in this channel and in selecting these goal variables and identifying
these norms. Based on the franchise agreement in this channel, dealers
must provide data to the manufacturers and its personnel on their
financial situation.
[Place Table 1 About Here]
Tvro manufacturer goals are inspected in this study. For each
dealership, the manufacturer sets a "sales objective" or targeted sales
volume figure for the year based* in theory, on demographics in the
region in question. The dealership's actual sales volume relative to
targeted sales volume represents an important measure of whether or
not the manufacturer's goals are being met in a satisfactory manner in
the relationship. Additionally, the manufacturer sets a variety of
other performance criteria for each dealership (e.g., the dealership's
market penetration in its trade area, local advertising expenditures)
and evaluates the dealership's performance on these criteria each year.
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whether satisfactory or unsatisfactory. If the dealership's perfor-
mance is rated as satisfactory, the manufacturer's overall goals are
being attained in a reasonable manner in the relationship. While the
dealer certainly would not mind reaching the targeted sales volume figure
or receive a satisfactory performance rating, they do not represent
primary dealership goals as it is apparent that the manufacturer's
interests are prominent in setting sales objectives and deciding what
constitutes satisfactory performance.
Three items were included in the questionnaire (asked of the dealer)
to measure these manufacturer goal variables: (1) "What was your 1978
new car sales volume for your PRIMARY make?"; (2) "What was your dealer-
ship's assigned sales objective for your PRIMARY make in 1978 (e.g., the
sales evaluation guide for General Motor's dealers)?"; and (3) "In how
many of the past five years have you received a 'satisfactory' performance
rating from your manufacturer?" The sales objective figure was subtracted
from the absolute sales volume figure in calculating the degree to which
the dealership has surpassed, met, or had not met its sales objective.
The last variable provides a picture of how the dealership's overall
performance has been evaluated over time by the manufacturer.
Note that the new car sales volume was not utilized as either a
manufacturer or a dealer goal because, in certain relationships in
this channel, sales volume can be a primary goal of both the manufac-
turer and dealer. In some dealerships, sales volume is not a primary
goal because manufacturers in this channel have a long history of at-
tempting to increase new car sales volume at their dealerships, often
to the exclusion of concerns for the dealerships' welfare (cf.,
Ridgway 1957; Assael 1968).
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As evident from Table 1, two variables were used to reflect areas
where the dealer is concerned about goal attainment, one financial, the
other managerial. Pre-study interviews indicated that while the dealer
may have other important financial objectives, return on investment was
the most important and the one most generally used to evaluate a dealer-
ship's success. Furthermore, a very important managerial goal of most
dealers is to run the dealership without a high level of outside inter-
ference from the manufacturer on their autonomous decision making, es-
pecially on major issues.
Each dealer was asked, "What was your approximate pre-tax and pre-
bonus return on investment for 1978? (Please check one)." Categories
ranged from less than percent to over 40 percent (in 10 percent in-
tervals). Two items were included in the questionnaire and asked of
each dealer to determine the degree to which the manufacturer has at-
tempted to blatantly interfere in the general operations of dealership
and raise question with its future viability: (1) "Has the manufacturer
ever suggested he mi^t put another franchise into your immediate trade
area?", and (2) "Has the manufacturer ever suggested he might revoke your
franchise?"
The norms in Table 1 were used in dividing each goal variable into
two categories, whether or not satsi factory goal attainment was achieved.
Then, each manufacturer goal variable was contrasted with each dealer
goal variable in opera tionaliz ing the relative goal attainment model.
This resulted in four relative goal attainment variables, each with a
distribution of two-firm channel relationships in each category of the
goal attainment model (Figure 1)
.
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Influence Strategies . Each dealer has contacts vd.th three boun-
dary personnel of the manufacturer: (1) the sales representative or
district manager; (2) the service representative; and (3) the parts
representative. Interviews with dealers identified the sales repre-
sentative to have the most frequent and primary contact with each
dealership. Thus only the sales representative's use of influence
strategies was measured here.
A recall technique was utilized in measuring the use of the
previously identified influence strategies. Each dealer was asked
in what percentage of their typical monthly contacts with the sales
representative (whether personal or phone contacts) did the represen-
tative directly try to influence his decision making on at least one
decision area. This item reflects the representatives frequency of
using relatively explicit influence strategies in the relationship.
The dealer was then asked in what percentage of these overall influence
attempts did the sales representative state or imply that (1) "You
would receive better service and/or cooperation if you complied with
his request" (i.e., a promise strategy), (2) "By following his sugges-
tions, your dealership would be more profitable" (i.e., a recommenda-
tion strategy), (3) "The franchise agreement either required or sug-
gested compliance" (i.e., a legalistic strategy), and (4) "You might
receive poorer service and/or cooperation if you did not comply" (i.e.,
a threat strategy).
The items used to measure use of a request strategy and a infor-
mation exchange strategy followed. It was felt that by asking about
relatively direct strategies first each dealer would better understand
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the description of these strategies. In measuring use of the request
strategy, each dealer indicated in approximately what percentage of
overall influence attempts did the sales representative merely state
his wishes on an issue without mentioning or implying any consequences
of compliance or noncompliance. Finally, to indicate use of the in-
formation exchange strategy, dealers were asked within what percentage
of their typical monthly contacts did the sales representative merely
discuss the overall strategy of dealership operations (e.g., the ef-
fects of inventory levels on sales or the necessity of a good service
department) without making specific statements about what he would
like the dealer to do.
Trust and Cooperation . Pre-study interviews indicated that a
dealer's general trust in the manufacturer and its personnel was based
primarily on the perceived interest of the manufacturer in the dealer-
ship's profitability and the manner in which the manufacturer's person-
nel react to interfirm disagreements. Additionally, the level of dealer
satisfaction with the dealership's overall relationship with the manu-
facturer was seen by dealers as an important contributer to the level of
their general trust of the manufacturer. As such, three items were in-
cluded in the questionnaire to reflect the dealer's general trust in the
manufacturer and its personnel: (1) "The manufacturer is very interested
in helping me make ray dealership profitable", (2) "Most of the disagreements
I have had with ray manufacturer reps in the past year were settled to my
satisfaction", and (3) "I am generally satisfied with my dealership's
overall relationship with the manufacturer".
To measure the dealer's level of trust with the sales representa-
tive, dealers responded to the following three items: (1) "I generally
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feel that ray sales rep is very fair in working with ray dealership", (2)
"I always have confidence in the accuracy of the information I get from
my sales rep", and (3) ">ty sales rep is sometimes less than completely
honest in working with my dealership" (reverse scaled for use in data
analysis). The dealer cooperation scale was composed of two items: (1)
"I try hard to maintain a good working relationship with my manufacturer
and his representatives" and (2) "I try to establish a give and take
relationship with the manufacturer reps." Seven point scales ranging
from 1, "Strongly Disagree," to 7, "Strongly Agree", were used in the
measurement of each item.
Factor analyses results confirmed that these items load together
in an appropriate fashion. Coefficient alpha was computed to be .8
and .68 for the general trust and specific trust scales. The split-half
realiability coefficient after full scale adjustment was .58 for the
two item cooperation scale.
Agreement With Manufacturer Positions . Dealers were asked to what
extent they agreed or disagreed with manufacturer or manufacturer rep
positions and viewpoints on the following six issues on seven point
scales ranging from 1, "Strong Disagreement," to 7, "Strong Agreement":
(1) local advertising expenditures, (2) number of salesmen, (3) new car
inventory levels, (4) participation in special programs (e.g., leasing,
training, and sales promotion programs), (5) parts purchases from the
manufacturer, and (6) warranty claims. Each issue was identified in
pre-study interviews as an important autonomous decision area of the
dealer in which the manufacturer was also very interested. Factor
analysis indicated that three factors could be isolated on these data.
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The first two issues load on one factor dealing with agreement on
"promotional strategy ." The next two items loaded on a factor labelled
"sales representative issues " (or areas where the sales rep has primary
responsibility) while the last two items are "part and service represen-
tative issues ". The split-half reliability coefficients after full
scale adjustment for these scales were .59, .56, and .54 respectively.
ANALYSES
Multivariate and univariate analyses of variance were used to
test the research hypotheses. Five different runs were made to test
each research hypothesis; one for each of the four two-variable com-
binations of the manufacturer and dealer goal variables presented in
Table 1, the other based on a composite scale derived by combining the
two manufacturer goal variables and the two dealer goal variables before
defining the goal attainment model. The results of these runs were
highly similar and consistent and, as such, only the data and signif-
icance tests for the relative goal attainment variable based on "years
satisfactory performance" (manufacturer goal) and "return on investment"
(dealer goal) will be presented in this paper. The "years satisfactory
performance" variable provides a picture of manufacturer goal attainment
in the relationship over time while ROI is the most important dealer goal.
In preliminaxry analyses, the primary manufacturer make of each
dealership was included as a control variable in each MANOVA. Each
of the goal variables in Table 1 vary in a significant manner by make
with the General Motors channel system generally out performing the
Ford, Chrysler Pljrmouth, and American Motors channel systems (in that
order) . Thus a possibility existed that the relationships between the
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goal attainment model and the business interaction, sentiment, and
compatibility variables would vary based on manufacturer make. The
results of this analyses indicated that the variable relationships were
stable within and across each make, that the interaction between make
and the goal attaininsnt model was not significant. In the subsequent
hypothesis tests, each MANOVA was significant beyond the .01 level.
Thus only the univariate analyses results are presented herein.
A Test of Hypothesis One
Table 2 presents the mean values on the communication strategy
measures across the goal attainment categories. For each strategy, a
significant difference in means exists across the goal attainment
categories. The pattern of means generally follows a priori expecta-
tions. The relatively direct strategies (e.g., recommendations,
promises, legalistic pleas, threats) have the highest use in the "poor"
goal attainment category, medium range use in dyads where one member
is achieving satisfactory goal attainment, and the lowest use in the
"ideal" category. Relative to ideal goal attainment relationships,
in the poor goal attainment category use of threats is almost three
times higher (5.5% versus 15.7%) while use of recommendations, promises,
and legalistic pleas is more than two times higher (e.g., on recom-
mendations, 13.1% versus 26.6%). Use of relatively direct, pressurized
strategies may be necessitated in "poor" goal attainment relationships
because of the economic climate that may adversely affect the manufac-
turer's and its personnel's credibility. A noncongenial atmosphere may
exist in such relationships with the dealer, in part, blaming the
manufacturer for his or her firm's poor financial performance. Dealer
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resistance and count erinfluence attempts may reinforce the use of threats
and legalistic pleas and ill-advised use of recommendations and promises
by manufacturer personnel.
[Place Table 2 About Here]
Unexpectedly, the means for the information exchange strategy are
relatively equal in the ideal and "one member" satisfactory goal attainment
categories (53.2%, 50.3%, and 52.1%). Perhaps the credibility levels
achieved by the manufacturer when it achieves satisfactory goal attain-
ment (and the dealer does not) overcomes conflicting goals which may
surface in such relationships making this strategy reasonably effective.
When the dealer achieves satisfactory goal attainment but the manufacturer
does not, the sales representative may overcome his or her tendency to
attempt to get quick results in all cases and uses the dealer's tendency
to balance the outcomes achieved from the relationship to his or her
advantage. However, as expected, information exchange is used least
frequently when neither firm is achieving satisfactory goal attainment
(41.2%). Low credibility levels together with the existence of a
relatively noncongenial atmosphere may make use of information exchange
strategies relatively ineffective in such cases.
Requests were used most frequently in relationships where one
member was achieving satisfactory goal attainment and the other member
was not, as anticipated. Requests may be unnecessary, to a large degree,
in ideal goal attainment relationships while ignored when neither firm
is achieving satisfactory goal attainment. Based on these results, HI
is generally confirmed.
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Aside from the variable relationships, the frequency of use of
the strategies closely follows the a priori predictions in Figure 2.
To provide a further view of the relative usage of the influence strat-
egies across the goal attainment categories. Figure 3 is presented.
Utilization of strategies in the ideal goal attainment category is
used as the standard of comparison in Figure 3. The vertical axis
represents deviations in strategy utilization from the ideal goal at-
tainment category across the mixed and poor goal attainment categories.
As evident, the largest deviations occur between the poor and ideal
relationships on usage of recommendations and the information exchange
strategy. Utilization of the strategies across the "mixed" goal attain-
ment categories are very similar except on legalistic pleas which are
used more frequently by the manufacturer personnel when the dealer
achieves satisfactory goal attainment but the manufacturer does not
and on recommendations which are used most often when the manufacturer
is the only one achieving reasonable goal attainment,
[Place Figure 3 About Here]
A Test of Hypothesis Two
The mean values in the dominant sentiment measures in the channel
relationship across the goal attainment categories are presented in
Table 3. Significant differences in means exist on the general trust
and cooperation variables across the goal attainment model. Levels
of overall trust and cooperation are highest in the "ideal" goal at-
tainment category (4.3 and 6.0) and lowest where neither firm is
achieving satisfactory goal attainment (3.8 and 5.6). The sales
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representative trust variable was almost significant at the p < .10
level and, as evident, its pattern of means across the goal attainment
categories conformed to a priori expectations. In relationships where
both firms are achieving satisfactory goal attainment, the dealer's
satisfaction level should be high (1) because his or her firm is reaching
its goals and (2) the manufacturer's personnel do not need to resort
to pressurized means to quickly Improve their firm's goal attainment
in the short run. When disagreements occur, however infrequent they
may be, they should be resolved rather quickly, making it appear that
the manufacturer is also interested in the dealer's goal attainment.
The perception of manufacturer interest in the dealer is also aided by
the relative prosperity of the relationship. Based on high credibility
levels, joint undertakings and consultation on business issues may be
looked upon very favorably by dealers in ideal goal attainment relation-
ships. H2 is, therefore, generally confirmed.
[Place Table 3 About Here]
A Test of Hypothesis Three
The means for the agreement variables across the categories of
the goal attainment model are exhibited in Table 4. Each agreement
variable varies in a significant manner across the goal attainment
categories. Agreement is hi^est in the "ideal" category and lowest
in the "poor" goal attainment category on each factor, thereby con-
firming H3. In poor goal attainment relationships, the viewpoints of
the manufacturer may be questioned to a high degree by the dealer.
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High levels of uncertainty about future business conditions and wel-
fare may contribute to relatively low levels of agreement on business
strategy as may (1) low levels of cohesion in the relationship and
(2) an emphasis on individualistic rather than joint goals.
[Place Table 4 About Here]
SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS
The results of this study indicate that the nature of relative
goal attainment between firms in the two firm channel relationship is
significantly related to the nature of business firm interactions,
sentiments, and compatibility in that relationship. These results
were consistent both within and across alternative manufacturer systems
in the automobile distribution channel. This study thus highlights
the importance that relative levels of goal attainment has on the inter-
firm interaction and outcome process.
Managers and boundary personnel involved in coordinating ongoing
channel relationships should explicitly consider the nature of each
firm's goal attainment when planning their influence strategies and
moves to improve the relationship. Results herein suggest that in
"ideal" relationships (1) a relatively indirect, implicit influence
approach can be effective, (2) the other member is relatively coopera-
tive in implementing programs within the channel with levels of trust
being relatively high, and (3) high levels of agreement exist on
general business and marketing strategy. The opposite pattern exists
in "poor" goal attainment situations, while in relationships where only
one member is achieving satisfactory performance, a mid-range picture
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is present. By acknowledging that such tendencies exist, managers and
boundary personnel can avoid following influence approaches and plans
which are inappropriate for the situation at hand. A segmentation
approach is thus suggested in implementing distribution channel strategy
based on the goal attainment category in question. The goals and ob-
jectives sought in a relationship should vary based on the goal attain-
ment situation. For example, in a "poor" goal attainment climate, to
attain the same influence and coordination objectives achievable in an
"ideal" goal attainment situation may be relatively difficult or at
least more costly to each party. Managers must guard against their
boundary personnel's improper use of influence strategies in situations
where their firm's goal attainment is poor, against their reacting to
conditions rather than taking a more long-run approach which facilitates
increased integration of channel activities and improved cooperation on
interfirm decision issues.
Even more importantly, rather than accept the current goal attain-
ment situation in the "mixed" and "poor" categories and react accordingly,
managers and boundary personnel should also consider how to improve
the goal attainment picture in their relationships. One obvious ap-
proach would be to actually improve levels of goal attainment by better
performance on marketing strategy, interfirm interaction, and general
business dimensions relative to competitors and providing assistance
to improve the operations and management of the other firm. Of course,
such a plan is not always feasible and attainable, especially for
financially centered versus managerial (e.g., lack of interference)
goal attainment variables. Another approach would be to help the other
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member see why goal attainment levels are less than ideal in the rela-
tionship. This may lead to more reasonable expectations and a better
chance for enhanced credibility and improved cooperation in the future.
Still another approach would be to attempt to alter the norms for satis-
factory performance which exist in specific dyads based on such factors
as geographic location, demand potential, differing business and mar-
keting strategies, etc. Thus with explicit recognition of the factors
which tend to exist under varying goal attainment situations, managers
can attempt to improve and restructure the channel relationship.
In terms of future research, perhaps more categories than the
"satisfactory", "unsatisfactory" dicotomy used in this study can
contribute additional insights in certain research situations. The
collection of data from each party in the two firm relationship should
be considered. A more individualized, personalized view of goal at-
tainment and an inspection of the interaction between these more per-
sonalized norms and industry norms may also prove beneficial. Applica-
tion of the goal attainment model to explain variations in behavior
and interaction across alternative channels rather than the two firm
channel relationship focus taken in this paper also appears worthy of
consideration.
FOOTNOTES
Pre-study interviews with approximately forty dealers in the
automobile distribution channel and several independent wholesalers
in the medical supply and equipment channel as well as a review of
relevant research in the marketing channels literature guided the
development of the model, the variables utilized to reflect the busi-
ness interaction, sentiment, and compatibility dimensions, and the
hypotheses.
2
What is an "ideal" or "poor" situation is defined based on the
channel in question based on norms which exist therein. Additionally,
as used here, they are "relative" concepts.
3 Channel relationships are defined by a series of product, service,
and/or information flows with each firm having a channel' role reflected
by a series of tasks and responsibilities (Gill and Stem 1969). The
offering of special rewards or promises by a firm's boundary personnel
on specific elements or tasks of their employer's role (e.g., product
allocation) may be perceived by a channel member as suggesting that the
present level of the source file's performance is not what it can or
should be. Additionally, if special rewards are offered (e.g., special
cooperation in expediting orders), the recipient of the promise may
perceive it as a form of bribery, as very unprofessional and insulting
(Raven and Kruglanski 1970).
4
Implicit in the reasoning so far is the notion that relative
goal attainment in the dyad is the driving force behind use of in-
fluence strategies, types of channel sentiments, and levels of agree-
menton business issues. These variables, however, may also have an
important impact on each firm's subsequent goal attainment.
Phillips (1981) and Phillips and Bagozzi (1981) stress that
within interorganizational research, multiple respondents from each
firm should be utilized in the data collection process. While this
recommendation appears to be valid across a wide variety of industry
settings, pre-study interviews in the automobile distribution chan-
nel indicated that one person within each dealership (either a dealer
principal or a general manager) had the primary responsibility for
interactions with the manufacturer and the sales representative or
district manager and for making decisions based on these interactions.
The use of multiple respondents in this context (considering the data
collected in the study) was felt to be inappropriate. The name of the
individual with the most prominent contact with the manufacturer was
utilized in the mailing process when available and the cover letter
and questionnaire stressed that this individual should be the study
participant.
Empirical results in (1981) indicate that the
influence strategy measures appear adequate in terms of convergent
and nomological validity.
Figure 1
A Relative Goal Attainment Model
for the Channel Dyad
Manufacturer Objectives (e.g., actual dealer
sales relative to territorial sales potential)
Sat^is^factory Unsatisfactory
Sat^ij^factory
Dealer Objectives
(e.g. , return on
investment)
Uns_ati s_fac to ry
cell one
Ideal situation;
both firms
benefit
cell two
Dealer benefits more
from the relation-
ship than the man-
ufacturer
cell four
Manufacturer bene-
fits more from the
relationship than
the dealer
cell three
Poor situation; both
firms are losing
Figure 2
Hypothesized Relationships Between Influence Strategies
and Goal Attainment
Frequency
of use
Poor Unbalanced Ideal
Information Exchange
Strategy
Request Strategy
Direct Influence
Strategies
Goal Attainment Category
Figure 3
Negative
Deviations
(Less Use
in Ideal
Relation-
ships)
Deviations in
the Use of
Each Strategy
Relative to
Ideal Rela-
tionships
Utilization of the Influence Strategies
Relative to Ideal Goal Attainment Relationships
Positive
Deviations
(Greater Use
in Ideal
Relation-
ships)
Reconnnendatioi
i
.Promises
k-^ Threats
K^ Legalistic
Pleas
Requests
Ideal
—Relationsh
Informatior
Exchange (
4-
Relationships Balanced
Toward
Manufacturer
4-
Relationships Balanced Poor
Toward Relationships
Dealer
Goal Attainment Categories
TABLE 1
Goal Variables and Channel Norms
Manufacturer Goal Variables
Absolute Sales Volume Relative
to the Sales Objective
Channel Norms for
Satisfactory Performance
Dealerships meeting or
surpassing the sales
objective
Number of Years Satisfactory
Performance (out of last five)
Dealerships with
satisfactory performance
ratings each of the last
five years
Dealer Goal Variables
Return on Investment
(Pre-tax, Pre-bonus)
Dealerships with an
ROT of greater than
10%
Lack of blatant interference
on dealership operations
Dealerships where no
threats have taken place
concerning (1) placing
another franchise in the
trade area and/or (2)
revoking the franchise
agreement
i
TABLE 2
J
Goal Attainment and Influence Strategies
Influence Strategy Variables
Goal Attainment Categories
Balanced Balanced
Overall Toward Toward
Mean Ideal Manufacturer Dealer Poor
n=385 n=126 n=99 n=85 n=75
Rej^at_ivel7
Indirect
Information
Exchange
Requests
Recommendations
Promises
Legalistic Pleas
\y Threats
50.5
27.1
18.4
15.4
6.6
9.8
53.2
24.r
13.r
11.1
4.1'
5.5
a,d
50.3 52.1 41.2
29.0 30.3 25.1
20.6 17.2 26.6
15.9 15.5 22.4
4.7 8.9 10.9
10.3 10.8 15.7
Relajtively
Direct
^To be read ; The mean for the percentage of manufacturer-dealer contacts in
which the information exchange strategy is utilized in the "ideal" goal attainment
category is 53.2. The significance test on each variable is based on a univariate
analysis of variance.
^p < .01
^p < .025
p < .05
TABLE 3
Goal Attainment and Business Sentiments
Goal Attainment Categories
Sentiment Variables
General
Trust
Specific
Trust
Dealer
Cooperation
Balanced Balanced
Overall toward toward
Mean Ideal Manufacturer Dealer Poor
n=385 n=126 n=99
4.1 4.3
3.9 4.1
5.9 6.0
a,b
n=8^5 n=25
4.1 3.9 3.8
3.9 3.8 3.8
5.9 5.8 5.6
To be read : The mean value for the harmony scale in the "ideal"
goal attainment category is 4.3. The signficiance test on each variable
is based on a univariate analysis of variance.
'^P < .01
'p < .05
Agreement Factors
TABLE 4
Goal Attainment and Agreement on Decision Strategy
Overall
Mean
Goal Attainment Categories
Balanced Balanced
Toward Toward
Ideal Manufacturer Dealer
n=385 n=126 n=99 n=85
Poor
n=75
Agreement on
Promotional
Strategy
Agreement on service
and part representa-
tive activities
Agreement on primary
sales representative
activities
4.2
3.8
3.7
4.3
4.0^
3.8
a,b
4.2
4.0
3.8
4.2
3.6
3.7
3.7
3.6
3.2
To be read ; The mean for the agreement on promotional strategy scale in the
"ideal" goal attainment category is 4.3. The significance test on each variable is
based on a univariate analyses of variance.
^p < .01
'p < .10
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